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Jersey Central Power & Light Co v Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission: Robert Bork 
on Public Utility Rate Regulation—and 
Lochner v New York 
Richard A. Epstein† 
INTRODUCTION 
There is little doubt that Judge Robert Bork’s reputation as 
a constitutional scholar depends in large measure on his pas-
sionate defense of the general doctrine of judicial restraint on all 
constitutional matters, both large and small. One remarkable 
departure from that basic posture was his notable 1987 decision 
in Jersey Central Power & Light Co v Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission.1 The opinion followed on the heels of two earlier 
decisions on the same question, both of which were subsequently 
vacated.2 At issue in the case was the question of whether Jersey 
Central was entitled to include in its rate base the $397 million 
of investment that were lost when the utility suspended con-
struction of a nuclear power facility at Forked River, New Jer-
sey.3 The project had been previously authorized some ten years 
earlier when both state and federal authorities feared an energy 
shortage brought on by a combination of the rising price of oil in 
the aftermath of the formation of OPEC and the high demand 
for energy to fuel the expanding economy.4 It was understood 
that, given the long lags between the time that a project is ap-
proved and the time it goes online, planning had to be done in 
 
 † Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter 
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall Distin-
guished Service Professor Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago Law 
School. 
 1 810 F2d 1168 (DC Cir 1987) (Jersey Central). 
 2 See Jersey Central Power & Light v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 730 
F2d 816 (DC Cir 1984) (Jersey Central I), vacd and remd 768 F2d 1500 (1985); Jersey 
Central Power & Light Co v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 768 F2d 1500 (DC 
Cir 1985) (Jersey Central II), vacd 776 F2d 364 (1985). 
 3 Jersey Central, 810 F2d at 1170–71. 
 4 Id at 1171. 
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advance.5 “All parties agree[d] that Jersey Central’s investment 
at Forked River was prudent when made.”6 For a variety of rea-
sons those predictions did not pan out. In part, conservation ef-
forts reduced the demand for power.7 “Furthermore, the pro-
tracted litigation and political controversy which attended the 
construction of nuclear power projects resulted in extensive de-
lays and dramatic increases in their ultimate cost. Thus, many 
investments [including Forked River] which were prudent, in-
deed considered essential, when made, have now by necessity 
been cancelled.”8 Clearly, no one factor drove the decision to can-
cel the project. 
In dealing with this issue in Jersey Central I,9 a unanimous 
panel upheld the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s de-
nial.10 But in Jersey Central II,11 Judge Bork and then-Judge 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg switched course and held that Jersey Cen-
tral was entitled to constitutional protection not only with re-
spect to the proper rate of return, but also with respect to the 
definition of the rate base on which that return was to be calcu-
lated.12 The great question in the eyes of many was how Robert 
Bork could have written this decision given his passionate de-
fense of the principle of judicial restraint on constitutional mat-
ters. But a close look at Jersey Central’s relationship both with 
Lochner v New York,13 a case so often the subject of Bork’s ire, 
and the more general question of judicial restraint, largely exon-
erates Bork from the charge of a fatal intellectual inconsistency. 
I.  BORK ON JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
 Bork made no effort to conceal his general hostility to judi-
cial activism. As a personal matter, I can recall attending in De-
cember 1983 a conference held at the University of San Diego 
School of Law on constitutional law that dealt with a variety of 
economic issues. I presented at the conference what eventually 
 
 5 Id at 1170–71.  
 6 Id at 1171.  
 7 Jersey Central, 810 F2d at 1171.  
 8 Id. 
 9 730 F2d 816 (DC Cir 1984) (Jersey Central I).  
 10 Id at 824.  
 11 768 F2d 1500 (DC Cir 1985) (Jersey Central II), vacd 776 F2d 364 (1985). 
 12 Jersey Central II, 768 F2d at 1502 (“After re-examining the issue, we are now 
persuaded that the end result test applies to both the calculation of the rate of return on 
invested assets and to the calculation of the proper rate base.”). 
 13 198 US 45 (1905). 
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became an article that I wrote for The University of Chicago Law 
Review entitled Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause.14 
The article essentially attacked the dominance of the rational 
basis standard of review in cases testing the limits of the Con-
tract Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides 
simply: “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obli-
gation of Contracts.”15 My own views are not my concern here. 
What was of interest at the conference, however, was Bork’s re-
sponse to the effort to salvage some measure of constitutional 
protection. 
There was a sharp disjunction between Bork’s views of anti-
trust laws16 and his views of constitutional law, where during his 
years at the Yale Law School he fell under the influence of his 
generation’s most distinguished defender of the principle of judi-
cial restraint, Professor Alexander Bickel, whose constitutional 
masterpiece was The Least Dangerous Branch, published in 
1962.17 Bork often encapsulated his objection to constitutional 
overreach in his fierce opposition to the majority opinion of Jus-
tice Rufus Peckham in Lochner, a case sustaining a challenge to 
a sixty-hour maximum-hour law. Indeed, at the San Diego con-
ference I remember vividly the verbal formulation that Bork ar-
ticulated in stating his standard of review in these Contract 
Clause–type settings: so long as some defender of the statute 
could utter with a straight face a rationale for the law that he 
knew to be wrong, the statute was in Bork’s view constitutional. 
His views on this subject never diminished, and he took the oc-
casion in his 1990 bestselling book (which had some choice 
 
 14 Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U Chi L 
Rev 703 (1984). 
 15 US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1. The Clause reads in full:  
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters 
of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but 
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any 
Title of Nobility. 
 16 See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 405 (Basic 
Books 1978). For an earlier expression of the same ideal, see, for example, Robert H. 
Bork and Ward S. Bowman Jr, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Colum L Rev 363, 364 (1965). 
For my discussion of these views, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Bork’s Bowman: “Not 
Gone, but Forgotten,” 79 Antitrust L J (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author). 
 17 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the 
Bar of Politics (Bobbs-Merrill 1962). 
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words about my own misguided judicial philosophy18) to attack 
Lochner as an abomination that “lives in the law as the symbol, 
indeed the quintessence of judicial usurpation of power.”19 
It therefore came as something of a surprise that, when 
faced with another claim for the constitutional protection of 
property, Bork ultimately came out squarely on the opposite side 
of the question in Jersey Central. Bork, writing for the majority, 
found that the court had the power to overturn the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission when it set confiscatory rates for 
the public utility.20 Bork himself was keenly aware of the possi-
bility that he would be attacked in Jersey Central II for a sup-
posed conversion to Lochnerism. Although Lochner did not sur-
face in the final decision in Jersey Central, it had arisen earlier 
when Bork was attacked by his fellow University of Chicago 
Law School alumnus Judge Abner Mikva for falling into the 
Lochner trap just by deigning to look closely at the rate chal-
lenge.21 To that challenge, Bork had responded as follows: 
Unlimbering the ultimate malediction of legal debate, the 
dissent accuses us of regressing to the jurisprudence of 
Lochner v. New York. Had we committed any such enormity, 
we would of course deserve the anathema pronounced upon 
us. But this seems disproportionate since our sin consists in 
nothing more than taking seriously the admonition of Hope 
Natural Gas, which is quite a different thing from reviv-
ing Lochner.22 
On this point, Bork was clearly correct. Matters of rate-
making may raise many issues in common with the economic 
liberty cases like Lochner, but serious differences separate 
them.23 In dealing with Lochner, the issues of health, safety, and 
worker exploitation were never far from the surface of the de-
bate. But the issues in all rate making cases are solely financial, 
without any of these explosive components. In dealing with this 
issue, moreover, it is clear that the major possibility for abuse 
 
 18 See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 
229–30 (Free Press 1990). 
 19 Id at 44–46.  
 20 Jersey Central, 810 F2d at 1178–79. 
 21 See Jersey Central II, 768 F2d at 1513 (Mikva dissenting). 
 22 Id at 1504 (citation omitted). 
 23 For discussion of Hope, see Richard A. Epstein, Dunwody Distinguished Lecture 
in Law: The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin Amendment: How Monopolies Are Of-
fered Constitutional Protection Denied to Competitive Firms, 63 U Fla L Rev 1307, 1331–
36 (2011). 
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lies with the government in its regulation of public utilities and 
not with the utility whose rates are regulated. These companies 
have to make extensive, irreversible investments in their facili-
ties before they can recover any revenues from their customers. 
So they face the very real problem that, once the investments 
are completed, the legislature will set rates so low that the pub-
lic utility could never, over the life of its plant, recover its initial 
investment with a suitable rate of return. 
II.  FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES IN RATE REGULATION 
At this point, rate regulation has to steer a middle path. The 
common justification for rate regulation, which Bork accepted in 
Jersey Central II, is that no public utility is entitled to earn the 
monopoly rate of return on its invested capital, which it could 
acquire from its customer base who (certainly at the time) has 
no alternative place to look for power. Yet at the same point, 
public utilities have a right to be protected against confiscatory 
rates.24 
The issue then arises of just how to accomplish this task. On 
this point, there were two main lines of authority, the first of 
which dated back to Smyth v Ames,25 which held that the utility 
could include in its rate base only those expenditures that were 
used and useful in the business.26 In effect, the basic argument 
was that the utility had to have incentives to behave as if it were 
a firm in a competitive market. Competitive firms do not recover 
on investments that don’t pan out, and the same should be true 
of a regulated public utility—hence, the Smyth approach’s possi-
ble line-by-line review of each claimed expenditure. But the quid 
pro quo for that proposition is that the rate of return on the as-
sets that do qualify for inclusion in the rate base should be set 
high enough to offset the risk they would become unproductive, 
which is just what happens in a competitive market.27 So the 
Smyth v Ames solution featured a small rate base with an up-
ward adjustment in the rate of return. It is worth adding, more-
over, that Smyth never did address the precise point at issue in 
this case, namely that assets would fall out of the rate base 
 
 24 See Jersey Central II, 768 F2d at 1503. 
 25 169 US 466 (1898). 
 26 Id at 546. 
 27 See Paul W. Garnett, Forward-Looking Costing Methodologies and the Supreme 
Court’s Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 7 CommLaw Conspectus 119, 129 (1999), quoting 
Smyth, 169 US at 546. 
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because of political opposition or environmental regulation as 
opposed to an unwise or unsuccessful firm investment. 
There are of course difficulties with this particular argu-
ment. Someone has to decide which assets are in and which are 
out. Once that is done, it becomes necessary to figure out the 
suitable rate of return on these assets. In principle, it could be 
claimed that the process is infected with a fatal form of circulari-
ty because no one can figure out the “fair value” of the assets 
without first knowing the revenues that they will generate.28 But 
it is just those revenues that have to be set on the basis of a fair-
value determination. I do not think that this difficulty is insu-
perable. The initial benchmark is the risk-adjusted rate of re-
turn in competitive industries. Once that is calculated, the ap-
propriate response is to reduce the utility’s rate of return to take 
into account its relative insulation from competition. 
Be that as it may, Justice William O. Douglas in Federal 
Power Commission v Hope Natural Gas Co29 took the position 
that the right way to compute rates was to avoid the complexi-
ties of these line-by-line calculations by changing both the rate 
base and the method for calculating the rate of return.30 The new 
rate base was the total capital invested in the business.31 The 
new rate of return was reduced to reflect that the risk of impru-
dent investments was now shifted to the rate payers.32 In effect 
the only task left for the Court was to see whether the “end re-
sult” of this process met constitutional standards of review: 
The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 
“just and reasonable” rates, involves a balancing of the in-
vestor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that “regulation does not 
 
 28 Justice Louis Brandeis put the point thusly: 
The rule of Smyth v. Ames sets the laborious and baffling task of finding the 
present value of the utility. It is impossible to find an exchange value for a util-
ity, since utilities, unlike merchandise or land, are not commonly bought and 
sold in the market. Nor can the present value of the utility be determined by 
capitalizing its net earnings, since the earnings are determined, in large meas-
ure, by the rate which the company will be permitted to charge; and, thus, the 
vicious circle would be encountered. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co v Public Service Commission of Missouri, 262 US 276, 
292 (1923) (Brandeis concurring). 
 29 320 US 591 (1944). 
 30 Id at 603. 
 31 Id at 624. 
 32 Id at 622. 
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insure that the business shall produce net revenues.” But 
such considerations aside, the investor interest has a legit-
imate concern with the financial integrity of the company 
whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or com-
pany point of view it is important that there be enough rev-
enue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital 
costs of the business. These include service on the debt and 
dividends on the stock. By that standard the return to the 
equity owner should be commensurate with returns on in-
vestments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. 
That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confi-
dence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to 
maintain its credit and to attract capital.33 
The adoption of this standard thus gives rise to the question 
of what standard of constitutional scrutiny should be given to 
these rate determinations. In one sense, the standard is pliable 
because it allows both methods of rate making to be used at the 
discretion of the legislature. But it is critical to note that the 
choice is between two internally consistent methods. It is not a 
rule that tolerates the selection of the narrow rate base coupled 
with the limited rate of return. The rule therefore rests on a 
composite of two distinct standards. There is a lot of slack on the 
way in which the end result is reached, but there is far less slack 
on what that end result must be. In this regard, the second com-
ponent almost looks like a strict scrutiny standard, which sets 
this case apart from the standard view that rational basis re-
view governs rate regulation. The instructive contrast on this 
part is between Hope Natural Gas, which has some teeth, and 
Yakus v United States,34 decided some two months later, which 
reverted to the lower rational basis test for a comprehensive sys-
tem of national price controls.35 In Yakus, the regulated parties 
did not have any invested capital, which triggered the rate-of-
return inquiry in Hope Natural Gas.36 Similarly, Justice Douglas 
in Hope Natural Gas also distinguished Nebbia v New York,37 
which adopted a rational basis standard of review for state laws 
 
 33 Hope Natural Gas, 320 US at 603 (citations omitted). 
 34 321 US 414 (1944). 
 35 Id at 457. 
 36 See id at 431; Hope Natural Gas, 320 US at 604–05. 
 37 291 US 502 (1934). See Hope Natural Gas, 320 US at 601, citing Nebbia, 291 US 
at 523–39. 
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that set minimum prices for dairy products.38 That decision rep-
resents the inveterate progressive impulse to foster cartels and 
monopolies. But that criticism is beside the key point, which is 
that the regulatory protection of these dairy farmers could not 
pose any risk of confiscatory rate making that did not allow 
them to recoup their cost of capital. 
III.  BORK IN JERSEY CENTRAL 
It was against this background that Bork had to decide 
what should be done given the decision of the New Jersey rate 
makers to disallow the recovery by Jersey Central of the in-
vestment that it lost when the utility cancelled its project. On 
this score, Bork got the first point correct when he wrote as follows: 
At oral argument before the en banc court, counsel for the 
Commission indicated that the “end result” test did allow a 
court to set aside a rate order when the company would oth-
erwise go bankrupt and the Commission had refused to take 
that into account. The source of this constricted standard is 
elusive, not to say invisible. Hope Natural Gas talks not of 
an interest in avoiding bankruptcy, but an interest in main-
taining access to capital markets, the ability to pay divi-
dends, and general financial integrity. While companies 
about to go bankrupt would certainly see such interests 
threatened, companies less imminently imperiled will some-
times be able to make that claim as well. Jersey Central al-
leges that it is such a company. The contention that no 
company that is not clearly headed for bankruptcy has a ju-
dicially enforceable right to have its financial status consid-
ered when its rates are determined must be rejected.39 
The point is of no little significance because it protects those 
public utilities that have low debt-to-equity ratios from confisca-
tory rates. Ideally, in a competitive industry, a firm will have 
full control over its debt-to-equity ratio, at least if it can get its 
lenders to go along. There is, moreover, no reason to think that 
the firm will not move to get the right amount of borrowed capi-
tal. But once rate protection is tied to the threat of bankruptcy, 
the entire calculus switches: the astute firm will increase its 
borrowing to the maximum level allowed, which in turn will 
 
 38 Nebbia, 291 US at 537. 
 39 Jersey Central, 810 F2d at 1180. 
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increase the risk of bankruptcy. Liquidation for a public utility 
does not work, as it must be kept as a going concern. A transfer 
of control does not work because there is no way to foreclose on 
the utility’s assets, given that banks do not know how to run 
these operations. Hence the high debt service allows the utility 
to increase its rates to service the debts. The higher leverage in 
turn helps increase the return on the smaller equity base. There 
is, however, no reason at all to allow this form of strategic be-
havior, which the Bork decision neatly blocks. 
It is therefore evident that Bork did some real good in curb-
ing his own natural instincts toward judicial restraint. But the 
question still remains whether he went far enough. On this is-
sue, I would fault him on two separate grounds. The first, hinted 
at above, is that I do not think that he, or for that matter the 
dissent, came to grips with the reason that the Forked River 
project cratered. In traditional rate-making hearings the busi-
ness risks that public utilities declare are their estimated costs 
of construction or the demand for their services. These declared 
uncertainties are reflected in the approved rate. In this instance, 
the source of uncertainty did not lie in these traditional market-
place activities, but in the entire set of political protests and 
general regulations that came quite literally from nowhere.40 If 
these had been anticipated correctly, the choice between the 
Hope standard and the Smyth standard would not have mat-
tered. The risk would have been factored in from the beginning 
so that the overall rate structure would have moved upward to 
compensate the utility for that risk.  
The entire situation is completely unnerving because there 
is no reason to think that any public utility can control future 
political or regulatory risks to the same degree that it can con-
trol the costs of its own construction. The purpose of “used and 
useful” is to incentivize the firm to make prudent investments in 
its own business. In the Forked River project, the party who 
needed disciplining was not the utility but the political activists 
and the various regulators at the federal, state, and local levels 
who could inject huge uncertainties into the project. Figuring 
out where the blame lies is no easy decision, but rather is a mat-
ter of complex apportionment that no one dealing with the case 
was prepared to undertake. Would the plant have operated in a 
less politically charged environment? The answer to that question 
 
 40 See id at 1171.  
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has to be yes, which is not to say that the fundamental econom-
ics had nothing to do with this particular decision. But it does 
indicate that the consideration of changed circumstances cannot 
be put to one side in thinking about these issues. 
Bork did not reach that conclusion in this case. Rather, 
what he did was remand the entire matter back to the lower 
court for an evidentiary hearing on how the rate-base issue 
should be decided.41 Indeed, one serious difficulty with this re-
sult is that it meshes only imperfectly with the Hope Natural 
Gas test, a point that became clear two years later when the Su-
preme Court faced the same issue of cost recovery for canceled 
projects. In Duquesne Light Co v Barasch,42 Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist concluded that no separate adjustment had to be 
made for these cancelled expenditures so long as the bottom-line 
rate of return was within the band of reasonableness under 
Hope Natural Gas, which in that case it was.43 From the record, 
it appears as though he would have reached a different conclu-
sion in Jersey Central, where the underlying financial position 
was a lot more perilous.44 It is worth noting, moreover, that after 
the public utility lost the case, the state reversed the outcome by 
statute to allow the inclusion of these expenditures in the rate 
base.45 
CONCLUSION 
The entire episode shows something about the difficulty of 
the rate-making problem, and about Bork as a judge. Although 
he was often transfixed by the rhetoric of judicial restraint, he 
was not a prisoner to his own doctrine, and in at least one case 
 
 41 Id at 1187–88. 
 42 488 US 299 (1989). 
 43 See id at 310, quoting Hope Natural Gas, 320 US at 602. 
 44 Compare Duquesne Light Co, 488 US at 312 (noting that “[n]o argument has 
been made that these slightly reduced rates jeopardize the financial integrity of the 
companies”), with Jersey Central, 810 F2d at 1198 (noting that Jersey Central “faced fi-
nancial distress”). 
 45  The Pennsylvania electric-generation market has since been restructured to 
more effectively resemble a competitive market. However, the new law still includes ref-
erences to a utility company’s ability to continue to recover in their rate base “transition 
or stranded costs” that “traditionally would be recoverable under a regulated environ-
ment but which may not be recoverable in a competitive electric generation market.” 66 
Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2803. See also 28 Pa Cons Stat § 2804(4)(v) (“[T]he utility shall not 
be required to reduce its capped rates below the capped level upon the complaint of any 
party if the commission determines that any excess earnings achieved under the cap are 
being utilized to mitigate transition or stranded costs . . . .”).  
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pushed back against the dominant practice of denying any seri-
ous constitutional review in rate-making cases. I for one think 
that he did not get to the bottom of a very difficult problem, but 
he is nonetheless to be commended for seeking to place princi-
pled limits on government power. He was right, of course, that 
the case was distinguishable from Lochner in terms of its judi-
cial pedigree. But it is very much an open question whether his 
harsh and habitual denunciations of Lochner had any intellec-
tual heft behind them. As the Lochner Court saw the matter, the 
New York state maximum-hour laws were a disguised effort to 
stifle competition in labor markets.46 Bork’s own extensive con-
tributions to antitrust law should at least have led him to ask 
whether the anticompetitive issue really mattered. David Bern-
stein’s recent book Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individu-
al Rights against Progressive Reform shows just how powerful 
those anticompetitive instincts were, and how unholy the alli-
ance was between the unions and the large bakeries that sought 
to drive recent-immigrant bakers from the market.47 The clear 
anticompetitive impact of this legislation cannot be ignored by 
anyone who takes the antitrust law seriously. Yet somehow 
Bork never put the two pieces together. Nor was he able to see 
the manifest tension between his devotion to judicial restraint 
and the cause of open markets and free competition. In Jersey 
Central, Bork made a solid effort to work out one facet of this 
problem. But it is unfortunate that, owing to his strong priors, 
Bork did not integrate Jersey Central with any larger vision of 
constitutional interpretation. 
 
 46 See Lochner, 198 US at 64. 
 47 David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against 
Progressive Reform 30 (Chicago 2011): 
[T]he bakers’ union conceived of and promoted the hours legislation not simply 
to address health concerns, but also to drive small bakeshops that employed 
recent immigrants out of the industry. The union also encouraged selective en-
forcement of the law against nonunion bakeries. Large corporate bakers, 
meanwhile, supported and also benefited from the maximum-hours legislation 
invalidated in Lochner. 
